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ment 2 l may in the alternative be instituted at the domicile of the
plaintiff. This applies to cases both of injury and of death. The
provision is silent with respect to the possible situation where
there are several dependents, each of whom resides in a different

parish.

Segregation
Charles A. Reynard*
At its 1958 regular session the Legislature adopted a dozen
acts intended to apply to six areas of racial segregation. Education was the subject of five of these measures. Public transportation provisions contained in two sections of the revised stat-

utes were repealed by two others. Registrars of voters and school
employees were promised continued payment of their salaries
during absence from their jobs by two other acts, provided such
absence is a consequence of federal action relating to voting or
integration of the races in public schools. In three other areas
single acts imposed (1) a requirement that blood to be used for
transfusions be labeled to indicate the race of the donor, (2) a
prohibition against the conduct of social, educational or political
activities by any local organization affiliated with any out-ofstate group if any of the officers or board members of the latter
are members of "Communist, Communist-front or subversive or-

ganizations," and (3) a duty upon the attorney general to, assist
registrars of voters when questioned by federal authorities. The
provisions of these acts will be discussed in the order of the
topical arrangement just mentioned.
EDUCATION

Adhering to its steadfast course of circumventing the Supreme Court's decisions forbidding the enforced segregation of
the races in public education, the Legislature took steps to provide for the closing of public schools threatened with desegregation and authorized a system of publicly financed private education in lieu thereof. A pupil assignment law, applicable to the
public schools, was also adopted. These measures were designed
21. LA. R.S. 23:1313 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 414, § 1.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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to fill the void created by the decisions of the federal courts'
invalidating acts adopted at the 1956 session, 2 discussed in these
pages two years ago, 8 which, in turn had been adopted to replace
legislation passed in 1954, 4 declared unconstitutional by the
courts. 5

As long as the Fourteenth Amendment remains a valid, enforceable provision of the Federal Constitution it seems scarcely
debatable that the school-closing, publicly financed private school
system will be declared invalid. Admittedly, of course, neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of the Federal Constitution requires a state to establish or maintain a
system of public education. It may also be conceded that the
regulation of the public schools systems of the various states is
not within the enumeration of the legislative powers granted to
Congress, and is within the power reserved to the states or to
the people by the language of the Tenth Amendment. And, finally, it may also be conceded that in the various enabling acts
making provision for admitting new states into the Union, Congress has frequently declared that systems of public education
adopted by the states shall be subject to their exclusive regulation and control. But neither Congress nor the states have the
power to excuse noncompliance with the Fourteenth Amendment
which forbids any state to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." And in this connection it must be recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
amends the whole Constitution, including the provisions of the
Tenth Amendment.
It follows, therefore, that it is completely within the unfettered judgment of the states to determine for themselves
whether they will or will not create systems of public education.
If they elect to do so, the amendment forbids them to operate the
schools in any manner that denies equal protection of the law;
and the Supreme Court's decisions have made it plain that forced
segregation, based solely upon race, contravenes the command of
the amendment. If, on the other hand, a state elects not to
1. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U. v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958),

cert. denied, 79 Sup. Ct. 31 (1958); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 163
F. Supp. 70 (D.C. La. 1958).

2. La. Acts 1956, Nos. 15, 249, 319.
3. Reynard, Legislation Affecting Segregation, 17 LOTISIANA LAW REVIEW
101, 103-13 (1956).
4. La. Acts 1954, Nos. 456, 555, 556.
5. Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957). See also same case, 252 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1958).
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establish a system of public schools, or to completely abolish one
already in existence, there is nothing in the amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution which forbids that decision. In a word,
it is state action, not inaction,which is the subject of the amendment's prohibitions.
While it is thus clear that a state may elect to pursue either
route-to establish and maintain public education (in keeping
with the requirements of the amendment) or to refrain from
doing so - it must actually choose and cannot attempt to do
both. It cannot operate a system of public education for qualified students in those areas where segregation exists on a voluntary basis, and deny the same educational opportunity to similarly qualified children in other areas where, in the implementation of the Brown decision, schools have been directed to desegregate. This is a denial of equal protection of the laws, not merely
to the Negroes involved, but to the white children thus deprived
of the same educational opportunity which is afforded generally
to qualified students in other areas of the state.
Thus it seems a virtual certainty that the provisions of Act
256, conferring power upon the Governor to "close any racially
mixed public school," but permitting the continued operation of
all other public schools in the state, authorizes the very kind of
",state action" prohibited by the equal protection clause. To be
sure, the equal protection clause has always been construed to
permit reasonable classification and it may be argued that there
is a classification here, as only those schools found to be "racially
mixed" are closed, while the other schools of the state permitted
to continue in operation are segregated. But classification on
this basis is the very thing which the Supreme Court has condemned in the public school cases. "In short," as the Supreme
Court itself said in Cooper v. Aaron,6 "the constitutional rights
of children not to be discriminated against in school admission
on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown
case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation
'
whether attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.' " 7
If, as indicated above, the school closing action itself is in
violation of the equal protection clause, it would follow that the
6. 78 Sup. Ct. 1401 (1958).
7. Id. at 1409.
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remaining provisions of the "educational package" would have
no role to play and discussion of them would serve no purpose.
It is possible, however, that legal attack may not be directed
against the Governor's closing order, but will be aimed at other
features of the legislative scheme should the measures be put
into operation. This has been the course of events in Arkansas
and Virginia under somewhat comparable provisions, as this
article is being written in mid-October. Accordingly, it seems
appropriate to examine the remaining provisions of the new
statutes.
Section 7 of Act 256 authorizes school boards to sell or lease
the property of any school which has been indefinitely closed
"to any private agency, group of persons, corporation, or cooperative bona fide engaged in the operation of a private nonsectarian school," for a consideration which "shall be equal to
the reasonable value of the property." Act 257 provides for the
creation of educational cooperatives and authorizes them to acquire and operate facilities in the fields of elementary and secondary education, including, presumably, any school facilities
which may become available for such acquisition pursuant to the
provisions of Act 256. School officials in Arkansas have been
temporarily restrained by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit from proceeding with leasing arrangements under the comparable provisions of statutes enacted in
that state. Final decision and the court's opinion in the case had
not been issued at the time this article was prepared for publication. Upon the basis of the discussion set forth above, however,
the temporary action of the court appears to have been properly predicated upon the ground that the closing of the schools
in the circumstances was itself state action which denied equal
protection of the laws to Little Rock high school students, both
white and Negro. When a state extends educational opportunities to all other qualified students throughout its jurisdiction but
withholds it in one community solely on the ground of racial
mixing of otherwise qualified students, the fact that it has denied equal protection of the law is too obvious to require argument. In such circumstances a court might properly be asked
to direct that the closing order itself be set aside. Certainly it
may appropriately forbid the state to dispose of the educational
facilities thus closed in order to further a subterfuge aimed at
the circumvention of the supreme law of the land.
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Just as the closing and leasing provisions of Act 256 pave
the way for the acquisition of school facilities by the cooperatives
organized under Act 257, the terms of the latter act set the
stage for the third phase of the circumvention maneuver- the
use of state funds to support education in a segregated setting
under the provisions of Act 258. As its title plainly states, the
purpose of Act 258 is "To provide for a system of educational
expense grants for children attending non-sectarian non-public
schools where no racially separate public school is provided."
Section 2 declares that "Such grants shall be available only for
education in a private nonsectarian school, and in the case of a
child assigned to a public school attended by a child of another
race, shall, in addition, be available only when it is not reasonable and practicable to re-assign such child to a public school
not attended by a child of another race." The amount of the
grant is to be "the per-day, per-student amount of state and
local funds expended on public schools throughout the state
during the preceding school year." (Section 3). Applications
for grants are to be made on forms prescribed by the State Board
of Education (Section 4), and must show that the child is attending a school which has been approved by the State Department of Education (Section 12). The actual grant, if given,
will be in the form of a check drawn by the local school board,
payable jointly to the parent of the child and the private school.
(Section 9). In view of the fact that such an expenditure of
state funds would violate the language of Article IV, Section 8,
of the Louisiana Constitution declaring that "no appropriation
from the State treasury shall be made for private, charitable or
benevolent purposes to any person or community," Act 557, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was adopted to be
submitted to a vote of the electorate in November.
It cannot be doubted that this program constitutes state action. State funds are being expended pursuant to carefully circumscribed conditions which are subject to the regulation and
control of various state agencies. Equally thinly disguised efforts to mask the hand of the state in order to discriminate
against Negroes in the field of primary elections have proved
ineffectual. When it was established that the primary election
was an integral part of the total process of electing candidates to
office, 8 it necessarily followed that a state political party, op8. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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erating under the terms of state law regulating the conduct of
such elections, was not a "voluntary association" or "private
club," and its act of excluding persons from the primary solely
because of race was "state action" within the contemplation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.9 And the repeal of the state laws
regulating primary elections did not exculpate the state from
responsibility for the discriminatory activity of the party.10 Nor
can it be said that Act 258 envisions a state expenditure aimed
at the general advancement of education as in Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education," sustaining the right of the state to
provide free school books to students in private and parochial
schools; the attack in that case (aside from state constitutional
arguments) proceeded on the theory that the expenditure constituted the "establishment of religion" contrary to the provisions of the First Amendment, made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth. Here the state does not propose to
extend the grants to any except those for whom public education
on a segregated basis is unavailable. This is obvious, not merely
from an examination of the provisions of Act 258, but in the
total context contemplated by Acts 256 and 257 as well. The
Supreme Court has already stated that it will not permit the
indirect nullification of the rule of the Brown case by such
12
methods.
The fifth and final measure in the field of education is Act
259. Under the terms of this legislation local school boards are
vested with "authority and responsibility for the assignment,
transfer and continuance of all pupils among and within the
public schools" in their jurisdiction. Criteria to be considered
in making assignments include available room and teaching capacity, transportation facilities, effect of the admission of new
students upon established or proposed curricula, suitability of
established curricula for particular pupils, adequacy of pupil
preparation, scholastic aptitude, intelligence and ability of the
pupil, psychological effect upon pupil attendance and associations
involved, threat of friction or disorder among pupils or others,
community reaction, maintenance of social and psychological
relationships with other pupils and teachers, choice and interest
9. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
10. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875
(1948).
11. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
12. Cooper v. Aaron, 78 Sup. Ct. 1401 (1958).
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of the pupil, morals, conduct, health and personal standards of
the pupil, and parental consent. (Section 4).
Parents may file objections to assignments or request the local
school board to assign pupils to other schools. If no hearing is
requested, the school board must act on the request within thirty
days. If a hearing is requested, it must be begun within thirty
days of the filing. (Section 6). Findings of fact and actions of a
board are final, except that objections founded upon rights protected by the Federal Constitution may be filed with the board
to be acted upon within fifteen days, with the right of appeal to
the district court. The decision of the district court may be appealed "in the same manner as appeals ...

in other suits." (Sec-

tion 8).
Section 7 of the act provides that "no child shall be compelled
to attend any school in which the races are commingled" if the
parent objects, in which case "such child shall be entitled to such
aid for education as may be authorized by law." Except for this
latter provision, Act 259 appears to be a desirable and much
needed measure. Critics of public education have long contended
that too little emphasis has been placed upon the elements of
skill and ability in the placement of students. At a time when
America's educational system is burdened with the largest enrollment in history and simultaneously challenged to keep pace
with our totalitarian neighbors in the training of future generations of scientists and technologists, legislation of this type is
well nigh a necessity. However, the inclusion of Section 7 in
Act 259 suggests that it may be administered to achieve different
goals. This is not to say that a school board order granting a
parent's request to transfer a pupil from a racially mixed school
to some other school would necessarily contravene federal constitutional guarantees. The order would have to be studied in
the total context of action taken. Another possibility that suggests itself, of course, is that school boards may discriminate
against Negroes in the course of applying the assignment criteria
set forth in Section 4. It was discrimination of this type which
recently led federal courts in Virginia to invalidate assignments
under comparable legislation and to direct previously all-white
schools to admit the Negroes involved.
Act 259 is substantially a verbatim copy of the Alabama
statute recently sustained against constitutional attack by a
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three-judge federal court. 13 There, however, the attack proceeded
upon the thesis that the statute was invalid on its face, and in
reaching its result the court said:
"All that has been said in this present opinion must be
limited to the constitutionality of the law upon its face. The
School Placement Law furnishes the legal machinery for an
orderly administration of the public schools in a constitutional manner by the admission of qualified pupils upon a
basis of individual merit without regard to their race or
color. We must presume that it will be so administered. If
not, in some future proceeding it is possible that it may be
declared unconstitutional in its application. The responsibility rests primarily upon the local school boards, but ulti14
mately upon all of the people of the State."'
In the final analysis, therefore, Act 259 must be appraised
as an instrument capable of surmounting many of the troublesome problems of modern public education, provided it is administered without discrimination based on race. If, on the other
hand, it is administered to preserve forced segregation it faces
constitutional condemnation (intimated in the Alabama case),
as held in the federal cases in Virginia.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
Acts 261 and 262 repeal six sections of the Revised Statutes 5
which required street railways and other public carriers to provide segregated seating facilities and to assign passengers to
seats according to race. These repealers were proposed for adoption as a result of federal court decisions 6 declaring the repealed
provisions to be unconstitutional. Since segregated seating had
been provided in compliance with these statutes, the presumed
purpose of the repeal was to revoke the legislative command and
pave the way for the continuation of the practice in a context
that will not constitute "state action" within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the privately-owned companies engaged in public transportation adopt and enforce a policy of
segregated seating, wholly uncoerced by statutes or ordinances
13. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372 (E.D.
Ala. 1958).
14. Id. at 384.
15. Act 261 repeals LA. R.S. 45:194, 195, 196 (1950) ; Act 262 repeals LA.
R.S. 45:731, 732, 733 (1950).
16. The district court opinion which is unreported was affirmed in Morrison
v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 78 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1958).
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of the state or any of its political subdivisons, there appears to
be no basis for invoking the protection of the amendment. 1 7 As
a practical matter, however, the adoption and enforcement of
private policies seem unlikely. If, on the other hand, public authority is employed in any manner to compel or influence the
adoption and enforcement of such a policy (whether in clear or
disguised form) a different case would be presented.
SALARY PAYMENTS DURING ABSENCE FROM WORK

Act 187 declares that the salary or other compensation due to
any state or local school official or employee shall be continued
"during time necessarily spent by such person away from his
normal duties as a consequence of federal action relating to
integration of the races in the public schools." The act further
provides that he "shall be considered as being engaged in the
actual performance of the duties of his office or employment,
regardless of whether he is merely engaged in a proceeding
before a federal court, board, commission or officer, or is imprisoned or confined pursuant to an order or judgment of a
federal court." Act 483 makes comparable provision for registrars of voters and their deputies, where absence is "a consequence of federal action relating to the right and/or privilege
of voting of any citizen ... served by said official."
Neither of these acts appears to present a serious federal constitutional issue, as written. It is conceivable, of course, that
they may be administered in a fashion, or factual context, which
could produce federal issues. More seriously, however, is the
question which arises under the language of Article VIII, Section 6, of the Constitution of Louisiana which reads in part:
"The following persons shall not be permitted ..
to hold office
or appointment of honor, trust, or profit in this State, to-wit:
.. those actually confined in any public prison; .... ." To the
extent that the two acts authorize the continued payment of
compensation during time spent in prison, it would seem that
the measures contravene the plain meaning of the constitutional
language prohibiting one so situated from holding an office or
appointment of profit. There are no Louisiana decisions in point
17. This was the precise holding in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
which were distinguished in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holding that
judicial enforcement of private acts of discrimination constitutes state action within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Pennsylvania v. The Board of
Directors of City Trusts of the City of Philadelphia, 78 Sup. Ct. 1383 (1958).
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insofar as violations of federal law are concerned. Three of five
state that violation of federal law
attorney general opinions
18
raises the disability.
BLOOD LABELING

Act 519, directed primarily at forcing the American Red
Cross to abandon its policy of refusing to label blood shipped
into the state to be used for transfusions, 19 requires that blood
be labeled to designate the race of the donor. Blood which is not
thus marked may not be used for transfusions in Louisiana except in cases of emergencies. Recipients of transfusions must
be informed of the race of the blood's donor if it is different from
their own, and penalties in the form of fines up to one hundred
dollars and imprisonment for terms up to thirty days are provided for violations.
The act's sanctions, as a practical matter, are applicable to
doctors, since they are the persons normally engaged in the administration of blood transfusions. The statute is therefore to be
regarded as a regulation of the medical profession. Viewed
strictly as a public health measure, there is substantial reason
to doubt its validity. While a state has broad powers for the
adoption and enforcement of measures designed or intended to
protect the public health and safety, these powers are not without limitation. All such measures are subject to the restriction
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which,
as construed and applied in this area, requires that the means
adopted have some rational connection with the end sought.
Compulsory vaccination for small-pox,2 0 sterilization of hereditary imbeciles, 2 1 and flouridation of municipal water supply to
deter dental caries in children 22 have all been sustained as reasonable exercises of the police power in the field of public health
when it was found that respectable medical authority supported
the action taken and despite the fact that the scientifiq thesis
was refuted by others. In the case of Act 519, however, there
18. OPINIoNs or ATTORNEY GENEMAL 1934-36, at 964; id. 1922-24, at 493 and
581. See also OPINIONS or ATTORNEY GENERAL 1938-40, at 766, 779.
19. See Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Wednesday, July 2, 1958, page 1, reporting that counsel for the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation presented

the bill before the House Committee and commenting: "He said its main purpose
is to force the American Red Cross to resume racial labeling of blood supplies
shipped into the state."
20. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
21. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
22. Champman v. Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 So.2d 142 (1954).
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was no showing that the racial mixing of blood in transfusion
cases poses any threat whatsoever to public health. The only
testimony presented to the committee on the point was that of
a pathologist who stated that it is impossible, from a scientific
point of view, to ascertain racial origin by the examination of
a given sample of blood.23 In these circumstances, therefore, it
would appear that a doctor or other person prosecuted for performing a transfusion in disregard of the act's provisions could
successfully invoke the defense of due process of law to avoid
24
conviction.
If it were claimed that the statute is not a public health
measure, but simply a regulation to protect the sensitivities of
people who may regard interracial blood transfusions "repulsive, ' 25 it is at once apparent that the act will fall under the
equal protection clause. The classification invoked here is predicated solely on considerations of race which the Supreme Court
has rejected again and again.
Here again, however, practical rather than legal aspects of
the problem are more significant. The American Red Cross,
whose policy against labeling provided the principal motivation
for the enactment, has refused to yield to statutory coercion and
has simply discontinued the shipment of blood into the state,
leaving Louisiana as one of the few states in which that organization will neither accept nor donate blood. As a consequence,
according to press reports, 26 real hardships are inflicted by the
act upon the innocent victims of disease and physical disorders
requiring transfusions.
SOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL, OR POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED
WITH OUT-OF-STATE GROUPS HAVING OFFICERS OR MEMBERS
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS
Although Act 260 makes no mention of race or segregation, it
is a fair inference that this measure was proposed and adopted
to restrain the activities of groups which oppose legislation
aimed at perpetuating enforced segregation.
23. See note 19 8upra.
24. Confronted with the prospect of being fined or imprisoned, it is clear that
the doctor in such a case would have standing to challenge the validity of the
legislation. In this respect the instant case is clearly distinguishable from Tileston
v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
25. See note 19 supra.
26. See Baton Rouge State-Times, September 1, 1958, page lB.
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Act 260 applies to "non-trading corporations, partnerships
and associations of persons operating in the state of Louisiana
and engaged in social, educational or political activities" which
are "affiliated with any similar" group existing "under the laws
of any other State." All such groups must, as a condition precedent to engaging in their activities, file affidavits with the Secretary of State by December 31 of each year, attesting that none
of the officers or members of the board of directors 27 of the outof-state groups with which they are affiliated is a member of any
organization "cited by the House of Congress un-American Activities Committee, or the United States Attorney General, as
Communist, Communist-front or subversive."
It is to be noted that this act fills a gap which is untouched
by two other statutory provisions dealing with related subjects.
Membership lists must be filed annually with the Secretary of
State by "each fraternal, patriotic, charitable, benevolent, literary, scientific, athletic, military or social organization," as a
condition precedent to engaging in operations in the state pursuant to R.S. 12:401.28 Subversive activity or membership in
subversive organizations is prohibited by the provisions of the
Communist Control Law adopted in 1952.29
Fairly construed, Act 260 will require churches, fraternal
organizations, labor unions, schools, colleges, charitable enterprises, political parties, professional societies, and a host of
others, most of which are commonly "affiliated with" similar
groups outside the state, to file the affidavit annually in order
to qualify to continue their activities in the state. Failure to file
subjects the "officers and members" of the group to fines and
imprisonment up to one hundred dollars and thirty days respectively, under the provisions of Section 3. Penalties are also provided for false statements appearing in the affidavits by the
language of Section 4, reading as follows: "Any false statement
under oath contained in such affidavit filed with the secretary
of state shall constitute perjury and shall be punished as provided
27. Section 1 of the act, forbidding activities in the state, speaks both of "officers" as well as "members of the board of directors"; Section 2, imposing the
affidavit requirement, speaks only of "officers."
28. The validity of LA. R.S. 12:401 (Supp. 1958) is open to serious question
in the light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in National Ass'n for
the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 78 Sup. Ct. 1163 (1958).

29. LA. R.S. 14:358 et 8eq. (Supp. 1952). The scope of the valid application

of this act has been seriously diminished by the decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,

350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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by LRS 14:123." This language raises a problem of scienter,
i.e., whether the affiant must have personal knowledge of the
facts concerning possible subversive activities of the officer or
board member of the out-of-state affiliate. While R.S. 14:123
states that "Perjury is the intentionalmaking of a false written
or oral statement" (emphasis supplied) it contains the further
proviso that "an unqualified statement of that which one does
not know or definitely believe to be true is equivalent to a statement of that which he knows to be false."
Leaving aside the questions of scienter as well as the inconvenience and possible embarrassment which would inevitably
attend the act of compliance with the act's provisions, there is
serious doubt that the statute is constitutional in its substantive
application. This is a measure which restrains "social, educational and political" affairs, a complex of activities which lies at
the very core of the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
While these freedoms are protected by the First Amendment
against congressional encroachment, it is now well settled that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends the
protection against state action as well. It is equally well settled,
of course, that the First Amendment does not license all such
activities, and permits of legislative regulation which protects
against clear and present dangers which may threaten society
through the medium of expression.
The principal difficulty with Act 260 is that it fails to relate
means to end. Granted that subversion is bad and that a state
may properly protect itself against the evils of subversive activity, this statute fails to show any relevance between the activities of a Louisiana group and the subversive conduct of an
officer or board member of an out-of-state affiliate. This is
regulation of action twice removed from the local scene. It is
submitted that this is guilt by the most tenuous kind of association. Guilt by association was condemned by the Supreme Court
of the United States more than twenty years ago in De Jonge v.
Oregon, 0 where it was held that a state could not convict a man
under a statute forbidding the advocacy of Communism (even
though he was himself a Communist) for speaking at a Communist-sponsored meeting which did not feature the actual advocacy of the activity forbidden but was restricted to a discussion
of local politics. Under the provisions of' Act 260 Louisiana
30. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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proposes to restrain social, educational and political activity, not
because it is itself subversive, but because the sponsor is affiliated with another group, the nature of whose activities is likewise immaterial, if one of its officers or board members belongs
to a subversive organization. It is submitted that the statute
fails to establish a satisfactory connection between the subversive membership identified and reasonably potential harm falling
within the protectable interest of the state.
Many cases have sustained the right of government to protect itself against political extremism. Advocacy of violent overthrow of government has been recognized as a proper basis for
the restraint of expression, both traditionally as well as recently,
where such advocacy consisted of urging others to action. 81 Even
membership in the Communist Party per se as well as personal
belief in the violent overthrow of government by force, has been
sustained as a valid legislative discrimination in the course of
the Court's review of the non-Communist affidavit provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act. 2 But at least two distinctions are to be
noted. In the first place, the Court reached its (divided) decision only after it was able to persuade itself that the congressional judgment that political activity in unions threatened interstate commerce was a reasonable one - a connection which is not
made clear in Act 260. In the second place, it was subversive
membership by the person against whom the discrimination of
the statute applied that was involved in the Douds case. Under
the terms of Act 260, Louisianians are denied the right to engage
in social, educational, or political activity, not by reason of their
own political affiliations, nor of the activities of the out-of-state
groups with which they are affiliated, but solely because of the
activities of officers or board members of the out-of-state group,
who may or may not influence either of the organizations. For
these reasons it would seem that the act unreasonably restrains
the exercise of freedom of expression and for this reason constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
ATTORNEY GENERAL TO ADvISE REGISTRARS OF VOTERS

Act 482 amends R.S. 49:255 and imposes upon the attorney
general the added duty of giving advice and aid to registrars of
31. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
32. American Communications Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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voters, their deputies and employees where any of their official
acts have been drawn into question by federal authority. This
advice and assistance is to be rendered without cost to the
registrar.
This measure, like Act 260 discussed above, makes no mention
of segregation or race, but the subject matter, background, and
sponsorship by the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation
makes it abundantly plain that it is a segregation act. Congressional adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 195783 and recent activities directed toward the enforcement of that legislation suggest that registrars will be confronted with questions of interpretation arising under the federal act and may face other legal
problems calling for adequate legal counsel. Questions of state
law may also be involved. For these reasons it seems quite
desirable to direct the attorney general's office to provide the
legal service required in such cases. Common representation
through his office will avoid confusion and conflicting interpretations which would almost inevitably attend representation
by individual or local counsel, serving in isolated cases without
the benefit of experience derived from working with the problem
on a state-wide basis. There is no question concerning the right
of the legislature to impose this additional task upon the attorney
4
general .

The 1958 Proposals to Amend the
Louisiana Constitutiont
William C. Havard*
The 1958 Louisiana Legislature was slightly more restrained
than its recent predecessors in terms of the number of amendments that it proposed for consideration by the voters in the
congressional general election. Even so, the reduction was slight,
since thirty proposed amendments were passed by the required
two-thirds vote of those elected to each house of the legislature.
33. Public Law 85315, 71 STAT. 634 (1957).
34. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 56.
tThis article was prepared prior to the General Election of November 4, 1958,
at which time the proposed constitutional amendments herein discussed were voted
on. All of the proposed amendments were approved, except Acts 535, 536, 539, 543,
546, 547, 556, 560, 562, and 563.
*Associate Professor of Government, Louisiana State University.

